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UNJUSTLY ENRICHED PRISONS: THE PROBLEM WITH 
CAPITALIZING ON CAPTIVITY 
Jazmen Howard* 
Abstract 
This Note sheds light on state practices that take advantage of 
vulnerable, captive consumers: inmates. States regularly negotiate 
contracts relating to services and benefits for inmates, using inmates—a 
captive market—to enrich themselves. States make key decisions, force 
changes, and earn profits by implementing contracts that affect inmates 
and explicitly block inmates from pursuing any standing to negotiate the 
contracts or to sue for any contractual breaches. A current controversy 
that provides an example of states’ consciously taking advantage of 
captive consumers involves giving, taking, and altering access to music 
and video devices. In that scenario, as a state continues to switch 
providers and increase profits, inmates must blindly surrender prior 
contract benefits in exchange for a new, different set of benefits and 
burdens. In such situations, inmates suffer both tangible and intangible 
losses, and states often disregard the adverse effects their business 
decisions may have on captive markets—especially when a state’s profit 
is completely dependent on its captive consumers. This Note focuses on 
the states’ gain and proposes a novel theory of unjust enrichment 
recovery if, in fact, prisons are unjustly benefiting at inmates’ expense.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the following scenario: Michael has been incarcerated in a 
state prison system for the last five years. At the beginning of his 
incarceration, Michael used his commissary account to purchase a media 
player and several songs to begin building his music library. The 
reasonable consumer expectation—even in prison—is that at the end of 
his incarceration, Michael will pay a onetime fee and take the media 
player home with him. However, the prison system recently announced 
that it will be switching media providers. As a result, Michael will have 
to forfeit his media player and lose all the files he has purchased over the 
last few years. Michael must determine whether he would like to keep his 
current media player—without the opportunity to add any additional song 
files to his music library—or sacrifice his current media player to 
participate in the new media arrangement. If Michael decides to forfeit 
his media player, he will have the opportunity to repurchase his song files 
through the new service provider at his own expense. However, the 
decision to repurchase his music will create another round of commission 
for the prison and additional expenses for Michael and his family. There 
are countless prisoners like Michael. And all the while, prisons profit 
more and more. 
This example illustrates how prisons profit—sometimes repeatedly—
from captive consumers without regard for inmate choice, autonomy, or 
identity. Because inmates like Michael have little choice (and even less 
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control) as consumers within the prison system, a prison1 can profit by 
structuring the captive market to benefit the prison—the product 
provider—rather than the inmate, the ultimate consumer. Apart from any 
constitutional or criminal protections afforded to inmates, such practices 
raise serious concerns about the propriety of these enrichments.2 This 
Note discusses seemingly minor contractual decisions that provide 
benefits to inmates, and the major consequences that those minor 
decisions may cause. Even operating under the assumption that inmates 
are fortunate to have luxuries such as media players and song libraries, it 
is possible that public prisons are consciously enriching themselves at the 
expense of their captive consumers. Could this enrichment be unjust? The 
law of unjust enrichment provides a viable path for holding prisons 
accountable for systemic overreach, which occurs when prisons profit—
on a large scale—by using control over a captive market to the prisons’ 
advantage. Media-provider agreements are only one example of 
potentially abusive tactics that undervalue inmates as consumers and line 
prisons’ pockets.3 Unjust enrichment may correct this imbalance. 
Michael’s hypothetical situation loosely tracks events currently 
unfolding in Florida, though these scenarios are not unique to Florida.4 
The Florida Department of Corrections (FDC)5 has decided to end a 
seven-year contract with Access Corrections (owned by the Keefe 
Group)6 that allowed inmates to purchase MP3 players, accessories, and 
 
 1. See Gary F. Cornelius, Jails, Pre-Trial Detention, and Short Term Confinement, in 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 389, 389 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. 
Reitz eds., 2012) (“Jails are not prisons. A prison is defined as a correctional facility, administered 
by the federal government or a state government, that confines adult offenders who are sentenced 
to terms of confinement for more than one year.”). This Note focuses on the conscious advantage 
taking of inmates within the prison system, though similar issues may be occurring in jails around 
the nation. 
 2. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
 3. See infra text accompanying notes 25–37. 
 4. For example, inmates of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections also experienced 
similar issues. See Mia Armstrong, Return to Sender: No More Mailing Books to Inmates in 
Pennsylvania, SLATE (Sept. 19, 2018, 6:58 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/09/ 
pennsylvania-prisons-ban-book-donations-ebooks.html [https://perma.cc/6JES-HRZK] (explaining 
the implications of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’s decision to eliminate inmates’ 
personal ownership of physical books within the facilities). Though beyond the scope of this Note, 
it would be worthwhile to conduct a nationwide study to determine the systemic consequences 
that occur as a result of these profit-centered tactics. 
 5. The Florida Department of Corrections operates Florida state prisons. See FLA. DEP’T 
CORRECTIONS, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/ [https://perma.cc/XHN7-6LXE] (“As Florida’s largest 
state agency, and the third largest prison system in the country, FDC employs 24,000 members, 
incarcerates approximately 96,000 inmates and supervises nearly 166,000 offenders in the 
community.”). 
 6. When referring to the media program, this Note uses the name “Access Corrections.” 
Access Corrections is the entity within the Keefe Group that focuses on the MP3 player programs. 
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song files.7 The FDC has entered into a new contract with JPay, a 
company that competes with Access Corrections.8 Under the terms of the 
JPay Contract, inmates have the option to purchase tablets that can access 
email, music, games, movies, and educational content for various prices.9 
Importantly, a Florida prison policy prevents inmates from owning more 
than one media device at a time.10 As a result, Florida inmates will have 
to forfeit the MP3 players they purchased from Access Corrections to 
participate in the JPay Tablet Program.11 Maybe one device is preferable 
to the other, and maybe not. The danger here is that the prison is operating 
with a profit-centered vision, and the directly affected parties—the 
inmates and the public—have no seat at the negotiating table. 
Collectively, Florida inmates have suffered an estimated $11.3 million 
loss due to this change of contract.12 Under the Access Corrections 
Contract, the FDC received $1.4 million in commissions.13 Under the 
 
See Access Corrections, KEEFE GROUP, https://www.keefegroup.com/companies/access-
corrections-114 [https://perma.cc/MZ2B-GJYP]. 
 7. See Contract between the Fla. Dep’t of Corr. & Keefe Commissary Network, LLC 
amend. 1, ¶ 1 (Mar. 29, 2009) [hereinafter Keefe Contract], https://facts.fldfs.com/Search/ 
ContractSearch.aspx (enter “C2562” in the “Agency Assigned Contract ID (if known)” field; click 
search; navigate to “Results” and click view under “View Audits”; click document tab; click view 
PDF of Amendment #6). 
 8. See Contract between the Fla. Dep’t of Corr. & JPay, Inc. (Apr. 17, 2017) [hereinafter 
JPay Contract], https://facts.fldfs.com/Search/ContractSearch.aspx (enter “C2885” in the 
“Agency Assigned Contract ID (if known)” field; click search; navigate to “Results” and click 
view under “View Audits”; click document tab; click view PDF of Original Contract). 
 9. See id. § II.F.3.a (describing certain services offered by JPay); see also Help, JPAY, 
https://www.jpay.com/Phelp.aspx [https://perma.cc/6N7Q-A65K] (describing services offered by 
JPay). 
 10. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 33-602.201 app. (2019) (designating one MP3 player 
per inmate as the maximum authorized personal articles of property within Florida state prisons). 
 11. See Ben Conarck, Florida Inmates Spent $11.3M on MP3s. Now Prisons are Taking 
Players., DAYTONA BEACH NEWS J. (Aug. 12, 2018, 6:39 PM), http://www.news-journalonline. 
com/news/20180812/florida-inmates-spent-113m-on-mp3s-now-prisons-are-taking-players 
[https://perma.cc/6GAX-7SL2]; Cory Doctorow, Captive Audience: How Florida’s Prisons and 
DRM Made $11.3M Worth of Prisoners’ Music Disappear, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 
9, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/08/captive-audience-how-floridas-prisons-and-
drm-made-113m-worth-prisoners-music [https://perma.cc/6EP7-PZ8H].  
 12. See Conarck, supra note 11 (“More than 30,299 players were sold, and 6.7 million songs 
were downloaded over the life of the Access contract, according to the Department of Corrections. 
That’s about $11.3 million worth of music.”). This Note does not focus on the profit making of 
the third-party vendors, though consumer rights organizations may wish to monitor those 
endeavors. The vendors negotiate with the prisons—rather than the inmates—such that the vendor 
profits are more aligned with traditional contract norms and relative bargaining power of the two 
in privity. See id. The vendors also profit from indirect access to inmates, but the prisons are the 
entities that are directly—and consciously—disadvantaging inmates within their custody and 
control. 
 13. Id. 
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JPay Contract, the FDC stands to receive value-added services and 
(more) commission.14 The FDC will receive a second round of profits for 
any song that the Florida inmates decide to repurchase for their music 
libraries, even though, under the Access Corrections Contract, the prisons 
have already received commission from a similar purchase.15 
This Note reveals the impact that profit-centered business tactics may 
have on captive consumers and their families. Further, it explains the 
shortcomings of contract law as it relates to third-party beneficiaries and 
suggests unjust enrichment law as a possible cause of action given such 
shortcomings. Because the inmates are, by the terms of the contract, 
incidental beneficiaries, traditional contract law will not afford them a 
remedy—or even standing to sue.16 Yet, prisons are still consciously 
enriching themselves and the wrongful profiting continues. Accordingly, 
this Note explores the novel theory of unjust enrichment as a solution to 
best protect inmates’—and perhaps the public’s—interests and to unravel 
the benefits obtained at captive consumers’ expense. 
Part I provides general background information on the prison 
commissary system and captive markets. More specifically, Part I 
summarizes the history of privatization in prisons and explains how this 
privatization has led to an increase in prison benefits and inmate losses. 
This phenomenon, in turn, plays into the idea of captive markets because 
inmates must make an “all or nothing” decision: purchase whatever the 
private company has to offer and accept the terms of the contract between 
the prison and the private company, or make no purchase at all. 
Part II explains the contractual relationships between the FDC and 
private companies and details the terms and conditions of each contract. 
Part II also includes summaries of the key entities’ roles and analyzes 
how a change in contract will benefit the FDC while costing inmates and 
their families millions of dollars.  
Part III explains traditional contract law’s third-party-beneficiary 
doctrine and addresses this concept’s failure to afford inmates the right 
to litigate on their own behalves. If inmates had contract rights, 
compensatory harms might be recoverable; however, prison systems 
design these contracts to leave the inmates vulnerable. The contracts 
 
 14. See JPay Contract, supra note 8, § II.F.18; id. amend. 1, ¶¶ 2, 7. 
 15. For a discussion of how the prison system is profiting at the expense of inmates, see 
Conarck, supra note 11, which provides statements from grievances filed by inmates and 
interviews with their families. See also Doctorow, supra note 11 (“[T]he Florida Department of 
Corrections and Jpay are poised to convert their captive population of prisoners into cash cows, 
to be milked for every penny their families can spare.”); Daniel Wagner, Profiting from Prisoners: 
Prison Bankers Cash in on Captive Customers, CTR. PUB. INTEGRITY (Nov. 11, 2014, 10:07 AM), 
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/09/30/15761/prison-bankers-cash-captive-customers 
[https://perma.cc/7Y2X-7ECQ] (“JPay has become a critical financial conduit for an opaque 
constellation of vendors that profit from millions of poor families with incarcerated loved ones.”). 
 16. See, e.g., JPay Contract, supra note 7, § VII.Z. 
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purposely place inmates in a lack-of-privity position as incidental, rather 
than intended, third-party beneficiaries. As intended beneficiaries, 
inmates would have the opportunity to attack these injustices. Since, in 
this particular Florida example, inmates do not have contract rights, 
inmates may need to turn from a compensation model to a gain-based 
inquiry—that is, from a contract lens to a restitution lens—to recover 
their losses. Part III also explains the concept of restitution and unjust 
enrichment and how such a concept may allow Florida inmates and 
citizens to bring claims against the FDC—even while they lack standing 
under tort, property, and contract law. 
Part IV provides solutions to remedy the injustices created when 
prisons contract with private companies and create compulsory contracts 
that do not consider inmates’ interests. These contracts expressly 
eliminate intended third-party beneficiaries, forcing inmates out of 
privity and into the role of the private companies’ sole consumers. 
Accordingly, Part IV addresses remedies that may be available to combat 
unjust profiting and offers a suggestion to the legislature on how to 
prevent the wrongful retention of profits moving forward. 
I.  BANKING ON BONDAGE: THE PRIVATIZATION OF PRISONS AND THE 
CAPTIVE MARKET 
“We a for-profit prison now. We ain’t people no more. 
We bulk items.”17 
The privatization of prisons allows for-profit companies to monetize 
“the physical incarceration and regulation of human bodies.”18 As a 
captive market, inmates find few choices and high prices as consumers. 
When companies contract with the best interests of a business in mind, 
the rights, fair treatment, and rehabilitation of prisoners—wards of the 
state—take a back seat. When private companies profit at inmates’ 
expense—by using the commissary system and Inmate Trust Fund 
accounts19 as money-making mechanisms rather than as tools to improve 
inmates’ quality of life—“monetization” begins to look like unjust 
enrichment.20 This context and “income” model show how prisons garner 
unjust gains by capitalizing on captivity. 
 
 17. Orange Is the New Black: Work that Body for Me (Netflix television series June 17, 
2016). 
 18. Laura I. Appleman, Cashing in on Convicts: Privatization, Punishment, and the People, 
2018 UTAH L. REV. 579, 579. 
 19. See discussion infra Section I.B. 
 20. See generally DAN B. DOBBS & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—
EQUITY—RESTITUTION 369–88 (3d ed. 2018) (explaining the theory of restitution and unjust 
enrichment). 
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A.  Captive Markets 
Inmates are the ultimate “captive market.”21 “Captive markets” are 
defined as “[m]arkets where the potential consumers face a severely 
limited amount of competitive suppliers; their only choices are to 
purchase what is available or to make no purchase at all. Captive 
markets result in higher prices and less diversity for consumers.”22 This 
type of system is most common in prisons because each prison may 
contract with whomever, and on whatever terms, it wants. That is, a 
prison may choose to enter into a contract with whichever private 
company will provide the prison with the maximum quantity—or 
quality—of benefits; a prison need not consider what may be best for the 
inmate population.23 In turn, prisons present inmates with few product 
options and inflated prices.24 Prisons enter the bargaining process with a 
profit-centered approach rather than considering the adverse effect that 
such an approach may have on inmates, who are a vital part of the 
negotiation process. For prisons, a larger number of inmates presents a 
bargaining advantage because an increased number of consumers 
generally means more profits for both private companies and prisons.  
The privatization of prisons has created new issues within prison 
markets.25 For instance, the increase in privatized phone and visitation 
services allows prisons to “not only make money off the backs of a 
captive population, but also reduce the contact and social bonds between 
prisoners and their home communities.”26 Each prison stands to profit 
 
 21. See, e.g., Implications of the Fair Labor Standards Act for Inmates, Correctional 
Institutions, Private Industry, and Labor: Hearing on S. 1115 Before the Comm. on Labor & 
Human Res., 103d Cong. 37 (1993) (statement of Sue Perry) (“[P]rison-made products do not 
even have to be competitively priced with private sector products, and these prison industries truly 
have a captive market.”).  
 22. Captive Market, LAW DICTIONARY (emphasis added), https://thelawdictionary.org/ 
captive-market/ [https://perma.cc/XG7A-QTQ6]. 
 23. See Appleman, supra note 18, at 583–84. 
 24. For example, a 4.2-ounce tube of Colgate toothpaste may cost $3.41 in prison, while 
that same tube may cost someone who is not incarcerated far less than $3.41. See Keefe Contract, 
supra note 7, attachment 1. Keefe Commissary provided inmates with two choices of toothpaste. 
Id. The prices were listed as $3.41 and $3.49. Id. 
 25. See Appleman, supra note 18, at 595–607 (explaining that the quality of aspects such 
as health care, transportation, banking, phone and visitation services, and food services has 
significantly decreased due to for-profit providers). 
 26. Id. at 603–04 (“Currently, prison phone companies can charge eleven cents a minute to 
prison inmates, and fourteen to twenty-two cents a minute to jail inmates. This is an improvement 
on the almost $1 per minute rate that was charged until 2015, when the [Federal Communications 
Commission] capped the vast majority of prison phone and limited the amount of add-on fees. 
These fees were a major source of revenue for prison phone companies.” (footnote omitted)). For 
a further discussion of the Obama Administration’s efforts to minimize the costly effects of the 
privatized phone industry, see Dana Liebelson, Obama Administration Approves Plan to Make 
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purposely place inmates in a lack-of-privity position as incidental, rather 
than intended, third-party beneficiaries. As intended beneficiaries, 
inmates would have the opportunity to attack these injustices. Since, in 
this particular Florida example, inmates do not have contract rights, 
inmates may need to turn from a compensation model to a gain-based 
inquiry—that is, from a contract lens to a restitution lens—to recover 
their losses. Part III also explains the concept of restitution and unjust 
enrichment and how such a concept may allow Florida inmates and 
citizens to bring claims against the FDC—even while they lack standing 
under tort, property, and contract law. 
Part IV provides solutions to remedy the injustices created when 
prisons contract with private companies and create compulsory contracts 
that do not consider inmates’ interests. These contracts expressly 
eliminate intended third-party beneficiaries, forcing inmates out of 
privity and into the role of the private companies’ sole consumers. 
Accordingly, Part IV addresses remedies that may be available to combat 
unjust profiting and offers a suggestion to the legislature on how to 
prevent the wrongful retention of profits moving forward. 
I.  BANKING ON BONDAGE: THE PRIVATIZATION OF PRISONS AND THE 
CAPTIVE MARKET 
“We a for-profit prison now. We ain’t people no more. 
We bulk items.”17 
The privatization of prisons allows for-profit companies to monetize 
“the physical incarceration and regulation of human bodies.”18 As a 
captive market, inmates find few choices and high prices as consumers. 
When companies contract with the best interests of a business in mind, 
the rights, fair treatment, and rehabilitation of prisoners—wards of the 
state—take a back seat. When private companies profit at inmates’ 
expense—by using the commissary system and Inmate Trust Fund 
accounts19 as money-making mechanisms rather than as tools to improve 
inmates’ quality of life—“monetization” begins to look like unjust 
enrichment.20 This context and “income” model show how prisons garner 
unjust gains by capitalizing on captivity. 
 
 17. Orange Is the New Black: Work that Body for Me (Netflix television series June 17, 
2016). 
 18. Laura I. Appleman, Cashing in on Convicts: Privatization, Punishment, and the People, 
2018 UTAH L. REV. 579, 579. 
 19. See discussion infra Section I.B. 
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EQUITY—RESTITUTION 369–88 (3d ed. 2018) (explaining the theory of restitution and unjust 
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type of system is most common in prisons because each prison may 
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prison may choose to enter into a contract with whichever private 
company will provide the prison with the maximum quantity—or 
quality—of benefits; a prison need not consider what may be best for the 
inmate population.23 In turn, prisons present inmates with few product 
options and inflated prices.24 Prisons enter the bargaining process with a 
profit-centered approach rather than considering the adverse effect that 
such an approach may have on inmates, who are a vital part of the 
negotiation process. For prisons, a larger number of inmates presents a 
bargaining advantage because an increased number of consumers 
generally means more profits for both private companies and prisons.  
The privatization of prisons has created new issues within prison 
markets.25 For instance, the increase in privatized phone and visitation 
services allows prisons to “not only make money off the backs of a 
captive population, but also reduce the contact and social bonds between 
prisoners and their home communities.”26 Each prison stands to profit 
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even have to be competitively priced with private sector products, and these prison industries truly 
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 22. Captive Market, LAW DICTIONARY (emphasis added), https://thelawdictionary.org/ 
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 24. For example, a 4.2-ounce tube of Colgate toothpaste may cost $3.41 in prison, while 
that same tube may cost someone who is not incarcerated far less than $3.41. See Keefe Contract, 
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Commission] capped the vast majority of prison phone and limited the amount of add-on fees. 
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a further discussion of the Obama Administration’s efforts to minimize the costly effects of the 
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from these captive markets by selecting companies that will offer the 
prison the highest amount of commission27 or, in some situations, the 
largest amount of value-added services.28 
“Securus, Global Tel*Link, and CenturyLink, which control over 
eighty percent of prison phone business nationwide, have spent millions 
of dollars on lobbying and political contributions”29 to pass legislation 
banning and criminalizing the possession of cell phones within prison 
facilities.30 The most common use of cell phones within prisons was to 
communicate with family members; the cost of maintaining an active cell 
phone line is cheaper than paying for phone calls from the prisons.31 
Securus, Global Tel*Link, and CenturyLink were at the forefront of the 
movement to criminalize the possession of cell phones within prisons, 
and this criminalization meant more income for these private 
companies.32 Unfortunately, supporting legislation and political 
decisions to directly increase private companies’ revenue is not the only 
instance of ethically questionable business tactics within the captive 
market arena.33 
Private companies used similar tactics during the growth of video 
visitation services. For instance, until May 2015, Securus Technology 
would not enter into a contract with any prison unless the prison agreed 
to eliminate in-person visits.34 Securus sought to ban in-person visitation 
 
Prison Phone Calls More Affordable, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 22, 2015, 11:23 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/prison-phone-costs-fcc-obama_us_5628f5f0e4b0443bb56 
2d907 [https://perma.cc/PZQ8-BD8N], and Ben Walsh, Prison Phone Company Fights to Keep 
Profiting Off Inmates and Their Families, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 28, 2016), http://www.huffing 
tonpost.com/entry/securus-technologies-prison-phone-industry_us_5627c31ee4b02f6a900f0837 
[https://perma.cc/9E6P-CDJ7]. 
 27. Appleman, supra note 18, at 603. 
 28. See, e.g., JPay Contract, supra note 8, § II.F.18. 
 29. Appleman, supra note 18, at 604; see also Private Prison Phone Companies Lobbied 
for Criminalization of Cell Phones in Prisons, EJI (Feb. 8, 2016), https://eji.org/news/private-
companies-lobbied-to-criminalize-cell-phones-in-prisons [https://perma.cc/MV6T-3AMD] 
(“Securus spent nearly $75,000 solely on lobbying for the Cell Phone Contraband Act, and 
CenturyLink spent $1,060,796, $3,850,000, and $4,170,000 on campaign contributions in 2012, 
2013, and 2014, respectively.”). 
 30. Appleman, supra note 18, at 604. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See IN THE PUB. INTEREST, HOW PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES INCREASE RECIDIVISM 
8 (2016), https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wp-content/uploads/ITPI-Recidivism-ResearchBrief-
June2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/VR53-HJKU] (explaining that recidivism rates have increased 
due to private prison companies decreasing inmates’ amount of communication with friends and 
family by replacing free in-person visitation with costly video visitation). 
 34. See id.; Eric Markowtiz, Prison-Tech Giant Securus Will No Longer Require Jails to 
Remove In-Person Visits, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 6, 2015, 9:18 AM), 
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with the goal of increasing the popularity of video calls, which would 
allow the company—and the individual prisons, via commission—to 
make more money through fees. “At last count, approximately 600 
prisons in forty-six states have some version of a video visitation system, 
and every year, more and more of those correctional facilities eliminate 
in-person visitation entirely.”35 The privatization of prisons serves mainly 
to benefit private corrections companies, and privatization thus harms 
captive consumers.36 The fees attached to video visitation vary—and 
higher fees give affluent inmates a greater advantage over inmates with 
fewer financial resources—while in-person visitation carries virtually no 
costs other than transportation and the minimal costs necessary to arrive 
at the facility.37 This situation illustrates a classic compulsory contract: 
Inmates must either accept the prisons’ terms and pay for video visitation 
or forego visitation altogether. 
Privatized prison services harm inmates in tangible ways. These 
services present several types of consumer harm:  
First, certain companies retain a virtual monopoly for these 
services, which eliminates competitive bidding for contracts 
and leads to extremely high pricing. Second, the high rates 
charged by private contractors for deposits into trust 
accounts and the use of prepaid debit cards are unfair—
appearing to be above the rates needed to ensure profit and 
not subject to the same regulations intended to prevent such 
abuses in other areas. Finally, a lack of viable alternatives 
and the necessity of these services lead consumers to enter 
into compulsory contracts to receive their own funds, forcing 
them to accept the undesirable and unfair terms.38 
In all, the private contracts between prison systems and private 
vendors ultimately harm the consumers. These forced arrangements are 




 35. Appleman, supra note 18, at 605; see also Jack Smith, The End of Prison Visitation, 
MIC (May 5, 2016), https://mic.com/articles/142779/the-end-of-prison-visitation#.67rjplgzz 
[https://perma.cc/BMS6-8AJ5] (explaining that video visitation is replacing traditional in-person 
visitation). 
 36. Appleman, supra note 18, at 606, 607. 
 37. But see id. at 609 (“Hawaii ships a full quarter of its convicted offenders out of state—
so many that [Corrections Corporation of America] has dedicated a special prison just for 
Hawaiians in Arizona. . . . This out-of-state incarceration often severely curtails family visits, as 
traveling over such great distances to see convicted family members costs both time and money.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 38. Catherine E. Akenhead, Note, How States Can Take a Stand Against Prison Banking 
Profiteers, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1224, 1235 (2017) (footnotes omitted). 
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from these captive markets by selecting companies that will offer the 
prison the highest amount of commission27 or, in some situations, the 
largest amount of value-added services.28 
“Securus, Global Tel*Link, and CenturyLink, which control over 
eighty percent of prison phone business nationwide, have spent millions 
of dollars on lobbying and political contributions”29 to pass legislation 
banning and criminalizing the possession of cell phones within prison 
facilities.30 The most common use of cell phones within prisons was to 
communicate with family members; the cost of maintaining an active cell 
phone line is cheaper than paying for phone calls from the prisons.31 
Securus, Global Tel*Link, and CenturyLink were at the forefront of the 
movement to criminalize the possession of cell phones within prisons, 
and this criminalization meant more income for these private 
companies.32 Unfortunately, supporting legislation and political 
decisions to directly increase private companies’ revenue is not the only 
instance of ethically questionable business tactics within the captive 
market arena.33 
Private companies used similar tactics during the growth of video 
visitation services. For instance, until May 2015, Securus Technology 
would not enter into a contract with any prison unless the prison agreed 
to eliminate in-person visits.34 Securus sought to ban in-person visitation 
 
Prison Phone Calls More Affordable, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 22, 2015, 11:23 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/prison-phone-costs-fcc-obama_us_5628f5f0e4b0443bb56 
2d907 [https://perma.cc/PZQ8-BD8N], and Ben Walsh, Prison Phone Company Fights to Keep 
Profiting Off Inmates and Their Families, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 28, 2016), http://www.huffing 
tonpost.com/entry/securus-technologies-prison-phone-industry_us_5627c31ee4b02f6a900f0837 
[https://perma.cc/9E6P-CDJ7]. 
 27. Appleman, supra note 18, at 603. 
 28. See, e.g., JPay Contract, supra note 8, § II.F.18. 
 29. Appleman, supra note 18, at 604; see also Private Prison Phone Companies Lobbied 
for Criminalization of Cell Phones in Prisons, EJI (Feb. 8, 2016), https://eji.org/news/private-
companies-lobbied-to-criminalize-cell-phones-in-prisons [https://perma.cc/MV6T-3AMD] 
(“Securus spent nearly $75,000 solely on lobbying for the Cell Phone Contraband Act, and 
CenturyLink spent $1,060,796, $3,850,000, and $4,170,000 on campaign contributions in 2012, 
2013, and 2014, respectively.”). 
 30. Appleman, supra note 18, at 604. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See IN THE PUB. INTEREST, HOW PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES INCREASE RECIDIVISM 
8 (2016), https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wp-content/uploads/ITPI-Recidivism-ResearchBrief-
June2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/VR53-HJKU] (explaining that recidivism rates have increased 
due to private prison companies decreasing inmates’ amount of communication with friends and 
family by replacing free in-person visitation with costly video visitation). 
 34. See id.; Eric Markowtiz, Prison-Tech Giant Securus Will No Longer Require Jails to 
Remove In-Person Visits, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 6, 2015, 9:18 AM), 
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with the goal of increasing the popularity of video calls, which would 
allow the company—and the individual prisons, via commission—to 
make more money through fees. “At last count, approximately 600 
prisons in forty-six states have some version of a video visitation system, 
and every year, more and more of those correctional facilities eliminate 
in-person visitation entirely.”35 The privatization of prisons serves mainly 
to benefit private corrections companies, and privatization thus harms 
captive consumers.36 The fees attached to video visitation vary—and 
higher fees give affluent inmates a greater advantage over inmates with 
fewer financial resources—while in-person visitation carries virtually no 
costs other than transportation and the minimal costs necessary to arrive 
at the facility.37 This situation illustrates a classic compulsory contract: 
Inmates must either accept the prisons’ terms and pay for video visitation 
or forego visitation altogether. 
Privatized prison services harm inmates in tangible ways. These 
services present several types of consumer harm:  
First, certain companies retain a virtual monopoly for these 
services, which eliminates competitive bidding for contracts 
and leads to extremely high pricing. Second, the high rates 
charged by private contractors for deposits into trust 
accounts and the use of prepaid debit cards are unfair—
appearing to be above the rates needed to ensure profit and 
not subject to the same regulations intended to prevent such 
abuses in other areas. Finally, a lack of viable alternatives 
and the necessity of these services lead consumers to enter 
into compulsory contracts to receive their own funds, forcing 
them to accept the undesirable and unfair terms.38 
In all, the private contracts between prison systems and private 
vendors ultimately harm the consumers. These forced arrangements are 




 35. Appleman, supra note 18, at 605; see also Jack Smith, The End of Prison Visitation, 
MIC (May 5, 2016), https://mic.com/articles/142779/the-end-of-prison-visitation#.67rjplgzz 
[https://perma.cc/BMS6-8AJ5] (explaining that video visitation is replacing traditional in-person 
visitation). 
 36. Appleman, supra note 18, at 606, 607. 
 37. But see id. at 609 (“Hawaii ships a full quarter of its convicted offenders out of state—
so many that [Corrections Corporation of America] has dedicated a special prison just for 
Hawaiians in Arizona. . . . This out-of-state incarceration often severely curtails family visits, as 
traveling over such great distances to see convicted family members costs both time and money.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 38. Catherine E. Akenhead, Note, How States Can Take a Stand Against Prison Banking 
Profiteers, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1224, 1235 (2017) (footnotes omitted). 
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participate in this relationship as defined by the prisons. Yet, these 
agreements are also underprotective in that inmates come away from the 
“deal” with no enforceable rights regarding the terms, services, charges, 
or any breaches. Without privity, inmates face a barrier to litigation 
because they cannot sue on their own behalves for any contractual 
shortcomings. These arrangements may include agreeing to terms that 
force inmates to pay absurd fees to access funds deposited into their bank 
accounts, to talk to their families on the phone, and even to participate in 
electronic media programs. 
B.  Commissary Within Prison Systems 
The commissary system is a prisoner banking service that acts as an 
automated teller machine between incarcerated individuals and their 
“outside” contacts.39 The system allows “outside” individuals to use their 
personal debit cards and money orders to deposit funds into separate 
Inmate Trust Funds, which serve as special prison bank accounts for each 
inmate.40 Inmates need access to funds within prison facilities because 
they are often required to pay out of pocket for various expenses within 
the prison, including items from commissary and, sometimes, rent and 
meals.41 Further, inmates may have to pay criminal restitution,42 court 
costs, child support, fines, and other expenses while incarcerated.43 As 
such, access to money within prisons is a necessity, but the necessity 
 
 39. An individual may add money to an inmate trust account in three common ways. The 
most common way an inmate receives money is from individuals outside of the prison, such as 
friends and family. Id. at 1232. These individuals may deposit money into an inmate’s account 
with their own personal debit cards. Id. Second, when the inmate is booked in the prison system, 
the money he has on his person may be deposited into the account, so long as the money was not 
earned via illegal activity. Id. Third, an inmate may deposit funds that the inmate earned from a 
job within the prison; however, the pay for inmate jobs within prison facilities is typically very 
low. Id. 
 40. See, e.g., Frequent Questions: Inmate Finances, S.D. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, 
https://doc.sd.gov/about/faq/finances.aspx [http://perma.cc/5RN9-Q788]; Frequently Asked 
Questions Regarding Inmate Funds, FLA. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/ci/ 
funds.html [https://perma.cc/RN6K-X95V]. 
 41. See Akenhead, supra note 38, at 1231–32. 
 42. Criminal “restitution” is not the same as classic restitution; criminal restitution is simply 
an amount that a criminal defendant must pay to compensate the victim of the defendant’s crime. 
See DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 370 n.4 (“Judges and lawyers sometimes speak of a 
convicted criminal’s duty to make restitution to his victim as a condition of probation or other 
leniency in the sentence. Restitution in this sense often only means compensation for actual losses 
suffered by the criminal’s victim, not necessarily a restoration of gains received, although the two 
may equate to the same thing in many instances.”); Akenhead, supra note 38, at 1231–32. See 
generally Cortney E. Lollar, What Is Criminal Restitution, 100 IOWA L. REV. 93 (2014) 
(discussing criminal restitution).  
 43. See Kirsten D. Levingston & Vicki Turetsky, Debtors’ Prison—Prisoners’ 
Accumulation of Debt as a Barrier to Reentry, 41 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 187, 188–91 (2007). 
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comes at the expense of the outside contacts who deposit the money into 
the inmates’ accounts. 
Before the electronic system was as widely used as it is today, inmates 
primarily received money orders via mail.44 As criminal justice scholar 
Laura Appleman has explained, “[a]lthough companies like JPay claim 
to streamline the provision of money from families to inmates, they have 
actually replaced the simplicity of sending money orders with a system 
which charges high user fees per transaction to deposit money via a debit 
card.”45 The fees attached to depositing money into one’s Inmate Trust 
Fund can be crippling,46 and though it may seem like the private 
companies are tacking on these fees solely for their own benefit, 
“[c]orrection facilities benefit from privatized banking as well.”47 The 
obstacles associated with accessing money within prisons present another 
method by which prisons and private companies benefit at the expense of 
inmates and their families. 
C.  Personal Property Regulations in Florida Department of 
Corrections Sites 
Before exploring issues specific to Florida prisons, it is important to 
note that the Florida Administrative Code regulates inmate property in 
the state.48 Appendix One (“Property List”) of the Code indicates the 
quantities of personal items authorized within the FDC’s prison 
facilities.49 The Property List provides that each inmate may possess one 
media player, one media player armband holder, one set of earbuds, and 
one pair of replacement earbud pads.50 Thus, inmates may only have one 
media player at a time. When prison facilities choose to contract with new 
media companies, consumers must sacrifice their old media players to 
participate in the new media programs.51 The “choice” is either to be left 
 
 44. Akenhead, supra note 38, at 1231. 
 45. Appleman, supra note 18, at 602. 
 46. See id. (“JPay . . . has charged fees as high as forty-five percent to place money in an 
account . . . . The choice is to pay the fees or go without [any money].” (footnote omitted)). 
 47. Id. at 602–03 (“[F]or every payment sent to a prisoner (usually at least one transfer per 
prisoner per month) the company remits between $.50 and $2.50 back to the facility.”); see also 
Dina Gusovsky, The Big Business of Selling Apps to Prison Inmates, CNBC (Oct. 1, 2014, 12:21 
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/10/01/the-big-business-of-selling-apps-to-prison-inmates.html 
[https://perma.cc/W7ZK-G88W] (stating that JPay charges anywhere between $1.45 and $24.95 
per transfer). 
 48. See generally FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 33-602.201 (2019). 
 49. See id. app.  
 50. See id.  
 51. Some may argue that such a sacrifice constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In fact, Florida inmates filed a class action lawsuit 
on February 19, 2019, alleging that the taking of their media files without just compensation 
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participate in this relationship as defined by the prisons. Yet, these 
agreements are also underprotective in that inmates come away from the 
“deal” with no enforceable rights regarding the terms, services, charges, 
or any breaches. Without privity, inmates face a barrier to litigation 
because they cannot sue on their own behalves for any contractual 
shortcomings. These arrangements may include agreeing to terms that 
force inmates to pay absurd fees to access funds deposited into their bank 
accounts, to talk to their families on the phone, and even to participate in 
electronic media programs. 
B.  Commissary Within Prison Systems 
The commissary system is a prisoner banking service that acts as an 
automated teller machine between incarcerated individuals and their 
“outside” contacts.39 The system allows “outside” individuals to use their 
personal debit cards and money orders to deposit funds into separate 
Inmate Trust Funds, which serve as special prison bank accounts for each 
inmate.40 Inmates need access to funds within prison facilities because 
they are often required to pay out of pocket for various expenses within 
the prison, including items from commissary and, sometimes, rent and 
meals.41 Further, inmates may have to pay criminal restitution,42 court 
costs, child support, fines, and other expenses while incarcerated.43 As 
such, access to money within prisons is a necessity, but the necessity 
 
 39. An individual may add money to an inmate trust account in three common ways. The 
most common way an inmate receives money is from individuals outside of the prison, such as 
friends and family. Id. at 1232. These individuals may deposit money into an inmate’s account 
with their own personal debit cards. Id. Second, when the inmate is booked in the prison system, 
the money he has on his person may be deposited into the account, so long as the money was not 
earned via illegal activity. Id. Third, an inmate may deposit funds that the inmate earned from a 
job within the prison; however, the pay for inmate jobs within prison facilities is typically very 
low. Id. 
 40. See, e.g., Frequent Questions: Inmate Finances, S.D. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, 
https://doc.sd.gov/about/faq/finances.aspx [http://perma.cc/5RN9-Q788]; Frequently Asked 
Questions Regarding Inmate Funds, FLA. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/ci/ 
funds.html [https://perma.cc/RN6K-X95V]. 
 41. See Akenhead, supra note 38, at 1231–32. 
 42. Criminal “restitution” is not the same as classic restitution; criminal restitution is simply 
an amount that a criminal defendant must pay to compensate the victim of the defendant’s crime. 
See DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 370 n.4 (“Judges and lawyers sometimes speak of a 
convicted criminal’s duty to make restitution to his victim as a condition of probation or other 
leniency in the sentence. Restitution in this sense often only means compensation for actual losses 
suffered by the criminal’s victim, not necessarily a restoration of gains received, although the two 
may equate to the same thing in many instances.”); Akenhead, supra note 38, at 1231–32. See 
generally Cortney E. Lollar, What Is Criminal Restitution, 100 IOWA L. REV. 93 (2014) 
(discussing criminal restitution).  
 43. See Kirsten D. Levingston & Vicki Turetsky, Debtors’ Prison—Prisoners’ 
Accumulation of Debt as a Barrier to Reentry, 41 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 187, 188–91 (2007). 
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comes at the expense of the outside contacts who deposit the money into 
the inmates’ accounts. 
Before the electronic system was as widely used as it is today, inmates 
primarily received money orders via mail.44 As criminal justice scholar 
Laura Appleman has explained, “[a]lthough companies like JPay claim 
to streamline the provision of money from families to inmates, they have 
actually replaced the simplicity of sending money orders with a system 
which charges high user fees per transaction to deposit money via a debit 
card.”45 The fees attached to depositing money into one’s Inmate Trust 
Fund can be crippling,46 and though it may seem like the private 
companies are tacking on these fees solely for their own benefit, 
“[c]orrection facilities benefit from privatized banking as well.”47 The 
obstacles associated with accessing money within prisons present another 
method by which prisons and private companies benefit at the expense of 
inmates and their families. 
C.  Personal Property Regulations in Florida Department of 
Corrections Sites 
Before exploring issues specific to Florida prisons, it is important to 
note that the Florida Administrative Code regulates inmate property in 
the state.48 Appendix One (“Property List”) of the Code indicates the 
quantities of personal items authorized within the FDC’s prison 
facilities.49 The Property List provides that each inmate may possess one 
media player, one media player armband holder, one set of earbuds, and 
one pair of replacement earbud pads.50 Thus, inmates may only have one 
media player at a time. When prison facilities choose to contract with new 
media companies, consumers must sacrifice their old media players to 
participate in the new media programs.51 The “choice” is either to be left 
 
 44. Akenhead, supra note 38, at 1231. 
 45. Appleman, supra note 18, at 602. 
 46. See id. (“JPay . . . has charged fees as high as forty-five percent to place money in an 
account . . . . The choice is to pay the fees or go without [any money].” (footnote omitted)). 
 47. Id. at 602–03 (“[F]or every payment sent to a prisoner (usually at least one transfer per 
prisoner per month) the company remits between $.50 and $2.50 back to the facility.”); see also 
Dina Gusovsky, The Big Business of Selling Apps to Prison Inmates, CNBC (Oct. 1, 2014, 12:21 
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/10/01/the-big-business-of-selling-apps-to-prison-inmates.html 
[https://perma.cc/W7ZK-G88W] (stating that JPay charges anywhere between $1.45 and $24.95 
per transfer). 
 48. See generally FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 33-602.201 (2019). 
 49. See id. app.  
 50. See id.  
 51. Some may argue that such a sacrifice constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In fact, Florida inmates filed a class action lawsuit 
on February 19, 2019, alleging that the taking of their media files without just compensation 
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behind with no access, or to surrender prior media with all its contents to 
enjoy the new media. Most prisoners choose the latter. But participation 
in a new media program is governed by whatever terms and rates the 
prison and the private company have established. 
II.  DEAL OR NO DEAL: THE PROFIT-CENTERED APPROACH TO 
NEGOTIATING CONTRACTS 
“It’s like the more money we come across, 
the more problems we see.”52 
In Florida, private companies have provided inmate benefits for profit 
for over a decade.53 Companies’ contracts with the prison system vary in 
some ways—for example, whether commissions are deposited into the 
State’s General Revenue Fund directly or deposited elsewhere54—but the 
contracts consistently allow the system to hold inmates and families at its 
mercy, with widespread implications on the economy, the general 
welfare, and the justice system.  
A.  The Florida Department of Corrections and Keefe 
Commissary Network 
The Keefe Group earns a profit from soliciting its services to jail and 
prison facilities.55 The company is comprised of six smaller operating 
companies: Keefe Supply Company, Keefe Commissary Network, 
Access Securepak, Access Corrections, ICSolutions, and Advanced 
Technologies Group.56 The Keefe Commissary Network (KCN) and 
Access Corrections (Access) are of particular importance to this Note. 
KCN is an automated-commissary-management service and technology 
 
constitutes a constitutional taking. See Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory 
Relief at 18–19, 21–23, Demler v. Inch, No. 4:19-cv-00094-MW-CAS (N.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2019) 
(“Through the implementation of the Multimedia Tablet Program, Defendant FDOC has violated 
the Takings Clause by taking the private property of prisoners who purchased digital media files 
without just compensation.”). However, this constitutional theory of inmate injury is beyond the 
scope of this Note.  
 52. THE NOTORIOUS B.I.G., MO’ MONEY MO’ PROBLEMS (Bad Boy Entertainment & Arista 
Records 1997). 
 53. See, e.g., Keefe Contract, supra note 7, § I.A. (executing the original contract on Mar. 
29, 2009). 
 54. See Conarck, supra note 11 (“In the Access Corrections contract, revenue left over after 
paying to run the program went back in a general fund controlled by the Legislature. But in the 
JPay contract, the Department retains any excess revenue in its administrative trust fund.”).  
 55. See About Keefe Group, KEEFE GROUP, https://www.keefegroup.com/home-100 
[https://perma.cc/3A4N-9SBR]. 
 56. Id. 
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company,57 while Access is a company that focuses on providing media 
and communication services within the prison industry.58 
The Keefe Group started exploring inmate benefits as a profitable 
enterprise a decade ago. On March 29, 2009, the FDC and KCN entered 
into an initial contract to provide “statewide canteen services” in state 
prisons throughout Florida.59 The FDC established a fixed-price menu for 
the items on the canteen product list.60 The contract explicitly provided 
that the “[p]rices shall not exceed the fair market prices.”61 Each sale was 
subject to sales tax.62 
Under the contract, KCN was required to pay the FDC a commission 
of the total sales.63 The commission rates were as follows: “Regardless 
of the amount of gross sales, [Keefe] will compensate the Department in 
an amount of $0.96 per day per inmate based on the Department’s 
Average Daily Population. . . . Compensation shall be paid for each 
calendar day of each contractual year.”64 The Master Canteen Products 
List (June 2011) provided the following inmate menu categories: tobacco 
and accessories, toiletries, sundry, health aids, personal property, drinks, 
candy, cookies/snacks, frozen entrees, condiments, postage, male only 
products, female only products, and other miscellaneous products.65 The 
contract is silent on commission from individual sales. The full-service 
canteen operations ceased on January 23, 2015.66 
The canteen services are only an example of KCN’s first foray into 
gleaning profits from a captive market. This business model may have 
become more sophisticated over time as it branched out to sell other 
products, such as music and entertainment devices, to inmate consumers. 
 
 57. See Keefe Commissary Network, KEEFE GROUP, https://www.keefegroup.com/ 
companies/keefe-commissary-network-112 [https://perma.cc/2Q3M-EU97]. 
 58. See Access Corrections, supra note 6.  
 59. Keefe Contract, supra note 7, §§ I.A, II.A. 
 60. See id. § II.I.1; id. attachment A.  
 61. See id. § II.I.1. Further, regarding price alterations, the Keefe Contract states:  
 The request for price increases must include written justification for the 
increase. The requested increase shall not exceed ten percent (10%) of the then-
current selling price of the item for which a price increase is sought. Any price 
increase that results in the price of a product exceeding the fair market price will 
be denied, regardless of the percentage of increase requested.  
Id. 
 62. See id. §§ II.L.4, II.Q. 
 63. See id. § III.A.1. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. amend. 1, attachment 1. 
 66. See id. amend. 4, ¶ 2. 
 
12
Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 1 [], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss1/4
138 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
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Technologies Group.56 The Keefe Commissary Network (KCN) and 
Access Corrections (Access) are of particular importance to this Note. 
KCN is an automated-commissary-management service and technology 
 
constitutes a constitutional taking. See Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory 
Relief at 18–19, 21–23, Demler v. Inch, No. 4:19-cv-00094-MW-CAS (N.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2019) 
(“Through the implementation of the Multimedia Tablet Program, Defendant FDOC has violated 
the Takings Clause by taking the private property of prisoners who purchased digital media files 
without just compensation.”). However, this constitutional theory of inmate injury is beyond the 
scope of this Note.  
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Records 1997). 
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 56. Id. 
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company,57 while Access is a company that focuses on providing media 
and communication services within the prison industry.58 
The Keefe Group started exploring inmate benefits as a profitable 
enterprise a decade ago. On March 29, 2009, the FDC and KCN entered 
into an initial contract to provide “statewide canteen services” in state 
prisons throughout Florida.59 The FDC established a fixed-price menu for 
the items on the canteen product list.60 The contract explicitly provided 
that the “[p]rices shall not exceed the fair market prices.”61 Each sale was 
subject to sales tax.62 
Under the contract, KCN was required to pay the FDC a commission 
of the total sales.63 The commission rates were as follows: “Regardless 
of the amount of gross sales, [Keefe] will compensate the Department in 
an amount of $0.96 per day per inmate based on the Department’s 
Average Daily Population. . . . Compensation shall be paid for each 
calendar day of each contractual year.”64 The Master Canteen Products 
List (June 2011) provided the following inmate menu categories: tobacco 
and accessories, toiletries, sundry, health aids, personal property, drinks, 
candy, cookies/snacks, frozen entrees, condiments, postage, male only 
products, female only products, and other miscellaneous products.65 The 
contract is silent on commission from individual sales. The full-service 
canteen operations ceased on January 23, 2015.66 
The canteen services are only an example of KCN’s first foray into 
gleaning profits from a captive market. This business model may have 
become more sophisticated over time as it branched out to sell other 
products, such as music and entertainment devices, to inmate consumers. 
 
 57. See Keefe Commissary Network, KEEFE GROUP, https://www.keefegroup.com/ 
companies/keefe-commissary-network-112 [https://perma.cc/2Q3M-EU97]. 
 58. See Access Corrections, supra note 6.  
 59. Keefe Contract, supra note 7, §§ I.A, II.A. 
 60. See id. § II.I.1; id. attachment A.  
 61. See id. § II.I.1. Further, regarding price alterations, the Keefe Contract states:  
 The request for price increases must include written justification for the 
increase. The requested increase shall not exceed ten percent (10%) of the then-
current selling price of the item for which a price increase is sought. Any price 
increase that results in the price of a product exceeding the fair market price will 
be denied, regardless of the percentage of increase requested.  
Id. 
 62. See id. §§ II.L.4, II.Q. 
 63. See id. § III.A.1. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. amend. 1, attachment 1. 
 66. See id. amend. 4, ¶ 2. 
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In July 2011, KCN and the FDC amended the contract to include a 
plan for implementing the MP3 Player Program.67 The program equipped 
FDC facilities with kiosks from which inmates could purchase MP3 
players, songs, and accessories.68 KCN was “acknowledged to be the 
owner of all equipment associated with the operation of [the] program.”69 
The contract expressly stated that “[t]he [media] player shall have the 
ability to be unlocked upon release of the inmate for continued use for a 
one-time fee paid by the released inmate to [Keefe].”70 
Inmates in general population and special housing units, including 
Death Row, Infirmary, Transitional Care Units, and Crisis Stabilization 
Units, could participate in the MP3 Player Program.71 Only inmates in 
Disciplinary Confinement did not receive the benefits of this program.72 
This means that every inmate, as long as the inmate exhibited “good 
behavior” and could financially afford the associated costs, was allowed 
to participate in and benefit from the MP3 Player Program. More inmates 
participating in the program equated to more revenue for both the FDC 
and KCN because both entities received a profit from the sales. 
Similar to the canteen service, inmates could purchase an MP3 player, 
songs, and accessories via funds from their Inmate Trust Funds.73 The 
Master Canteen Products List records the following prices: (1) MP3 
Player, 8G: $119.95; (2) MP3 Player, 4G: $99.95; (3) Armband: $15.00; 
(4) Protective Cover: $6.00; (5) Earbuds: $16.00; (6) Song Credits, 1 
Credit (5 Songs): $8.50.74 To purchase a song, an inmate had to purchase 
at least one song credit—and thus five songs—at a time; each individual 
song was therefore valued at $1.70.75 
The Access Contract provided for the FDC’s commission per sale.76 
The commission rates for the MP3 Player Program sales were as follows: 
(1) $0.20 per downloaded song; (2) $2.00 per armband; (3) $1.00 per 
earbud; and (4) $1.00 per protective cover.77 Per the contract, “[p]ursuant 
to Section 945.215, Florida Statutes, the Department must deposit the net 
proceeds from the guaranteed per diem payment into the State’s General 
 
 67. See id. amend. 1, ¶ 1. 
 68. See id. amend. 1, ¶ 6. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. amend. 1, ¶ 7. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. § II.X; id. amend. 1, ¶ 6. For a discussion of Inmate Trust Fund accounts, see 
supra Section I.B. 
 74. See Keefe Contract, supra note 7, amend. 1, attachment 1. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. amend. 1, ¶ 16. 
 77. See id. 
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Revenue fund.”78 In other words, the excess money generated from the 
Access Contract benefited the state as a whole, rather than the prison 
system. This approach, though still profit-centered in nature, allowed 
Florida citizens to receive benefits from inmate purchases. Instead of 
focusing solely on how the captive market could enrich the prisons, the 
contract allowed enrichments to flow beyond prison walls and into the 
Sunshine State. In other words, if these benefits are in any part unjust, 
both the prisons and the state are recipients of unjust gains. 
B.  The Florida Department of Corrections and JPay 
Securus Technologies, an inmate-communication servicer,79 owns 
JPay,80 which describes itself as “not a commissary company nor . . . an 
inmate telephone company. We are a software company focused on 
building and delivering innovative inmate service applications.”81 In 
short, JPay is an electronic-money-transfer and telecommunications 
service for inmates. 
The FDC and JPay entered into a contract on April 17, 2017.82 Under 
the contract, JPay will provide multimedia kiosks and tablets for inmates’ 
use.83 “[I]nmates can use [the kiosks] to purchase tablets preloaded with 
a variety of educational and entertainment content. Inmates can also 
browse and purchase additional content for these tablets, including music, 
games, news, and eBooks.”84 Similar to the Access players,85 inmates 
 
 78. See id. § II.F.5. Section 945.215(1)(d) of the Florida Statutes reads:  
All proceeds from the following sources must be deposited in the General 
Revenue Fund: 1. The confiscation and liquidation of any contraband found 
upon, or in the possession of, any inmate; 2. Disciplinary fines imposed against 
inmates; 3. Forfeitures of inmate earnings; and 4. Unexpended balances in 
individual inmate trust fund accounts of less than $1. 
FLA. STAT. § 945.215(1)(d) (2018). 
 79. See About Us, SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, https://securustech.net/web/securus/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/C7Y9-7FEB]. For a discussion of Securus’s sketchy business tactics, see notes 
28–36 and accompanying text. 
 80. See About JPay, JPAY, https://www.JPay.com/AboutUs.aspx [https://perma.cc/C7Y9-
7FEB]. 
 81. JPAY, INC., REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL NO. 1901: TECHNICAL PROPOSAL 5 (2011), 
https://static.prisonpolicy.org/scans/cards/RFP_1901_JPay_Technical_Proposal.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/4DRK-KQBB] (proposing a solution to Nevada for the implementation of inmate 
kiosks). 
 82. See JPay Contract, supra note 8, § I.A. 
 83. Id. § II.A. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Keefe Contract, supra note 7, amend. 1, ¶ 6. 
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to Section 945.215, Florida Statutes, the Department must deposit the net 
proceeds from the guaranteed per diem payment into the State’s General 
 
 67. See id. amend. 1, ¶ 1. 
 68. See id. amend. 1, ¶ 6. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. amend. 1, ¶ 7. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. § II.X; id. amend. 1, ¶ 6. For a discussion of Inmate Trust Fund accounts, see 
supra Section I.B. 
 74. See Keefe Contract, supra note 7, amend. 1, attachment 1. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. amend. 1, ¶ 16. 
 77. See id. 
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Revenue fund.”78 In other words, the excess money generated from the 
Access Contract benefited the state as a whole, rather than the prison 
system. This approach, though still profit-centered in nature, allowed 
Florida citizens to receive benefits from inmate purchases. Instead of 
focusing solely on how the captive market could enrich the prisons, the 
contract allowed enrichments to flow beyond prison walls and into the 
Sunshine State. In other words, if these benefits are in any part unjust, 
both the prisons and the state are recipients of unjust gains. 
B.  The Florida Department of Corrections and JPay 
Securus Technologies, an inmate-communication servicer,79 owns 
JPay,80 which describes itself as “not a commissary company nor . . . an 
inmate telephone company. We are a software company focused on 
building and delivering innovative inmate service applications.”81 In 
short, JPay is an electronic-money-transfer and telecommunications 
service for inmates. 
The FDC and JPay entered into a contract on April 17, 2017.82 Under 
the contract, JPay will provide multimedia kiosks and tablets for inmates’ 
use.83 “[I]nmates can use [the kiosks] to purchase tablets preloaded with 
a variety of educational and entertainment content. Inmates can also 
browse and purchase additional content for these tablets, including music, 
games, news, and eBooks.”84 Similar to the Access players,85 inmates 
 
 78. See id. § II.F.5. Section 945.215(1)(d) of the Florida Statutes reads:  
All proceeds from the following sources must be deposited in the General 
Revenue Fund: 1. The confiscation and liquidation of any contraband found 
upon, or in the possession of, any inmate; 2. Disciplinary fines imposed against 
inmates; 3. Forfeitures of inmate earnings; and 4. Unexpended balances in 
individual inmate trust fund accounts of less than $1. 
FLA. STAT. § 945.215(1)(d) (2018). 
 79. See About Us, SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, https://securustech.net/web/securus/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/C7Y9-7FEB]. For a discussion of Securus’s sketchy business tactics, see notes 
28–36 and accompanying text. 
 80. See About JPay, JPAY, https://www.JPay.com/AboutUs.aspx [https://perma.cc/C7Y9-
7FEB]. 
 81. JPAY, INC., REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL NO. 1901: TECHNICAL PROPOSAL 5 (2011), 
https://static.prisonpolicy.org/scans/cards/RFP_1901_JPay_Technical_Proposal.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/4DRK-KQBB] (proposing a solution to Nevada for the implementation of inmate 
kiosks). 
 82. See JPay Contract, supra note 8, § I.A. 
 83. Id. § II.A. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Keefe Contract, supra note 7, amend. 1, ¶ 6. 
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may unlock and take home the JPay tablets once an inmate completes his 
prison sentence.86 
Inmates can purchase additional content through JPay Media 
Accounts.87 Each prepaid account is linked to the inmate’s tablet, 
transaction history, and Inmate Trust Fund account.88 The FDC has opted 
to have the JPay Media Account and Inmate Trust Fund linked—as 
opposed to operating as separate financial wallets—to “ensur[e] that 
inmates are not able to place funds in their JPay Media Account as a way 
to circumvent paying debts owed to the [FDC].”89 Simply put, the FDC 
can control how inmates use their personal funds. The JPay Media 
Accounts function like traditional commissary accounts in that inmates 
may load money onto the accounts and check their account balances.90 
Unlike Access’s fixed price list, the JPay prices vary.91 Under the JPay 
Program, inmates can purchase individual songs rather than having to buy 
five songs at a time as they did under the Access Program.92 JPay’s Fee 
Structure indicates the following prices: (1) JP5mini Tablet: $79.99; (2) 
JP5S Tablet: $129.99; (3) Replacement Earbuds: $10.00; (4) Armband: 
$10.00; (5) Songs: $1.00–$2.50.93 The JPay Contract brings attention to 
the inmates who previously owned Access players. It states: 
Once [JPay] receives a list of inmates who own [Access] 
players, a 60-day promotional period will begin in which 
[JPay] will, via the kiosk, enable inmates who own a[n 
Access] player to obtain a free JP5mini or purchase a JP5S 
7” player for $50. Inmates who own a[n Access] player will 
also receive a $10 media credit within two (2) weeks of 
placing their player order.94 
The FDC fully implemented the JPay Program on January 23, 2019—
the date on which the FDC removed the inmates’ Access MP3 Players.95 
Similar to the Access Contract, the JPay Contract provides a commission 
scale under which private Florida prison facilities shall be compensated 
 
 86. See JPay Contract, supra note 8, § II.F.3. 
 87. See id. § II.F.8.g. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. § II.F.2. 
 91. Compare Keefe Contract, supra note 7, amend. 1, attachment 1 (demonstrating fixed 
prices for certain items), with JPay Contract, supra note 8, attachment A (demonstrating that 
prices may vary). 
 92. See JPay Contract, supra note 8, attachment A. 
 93. See id.; see also id. § II.F.17 (“[JPay] will offer tablets . . . at 50% off for a 60-day 
promotional period. After the promotional period, all inmates will purchase their tablet and 
applications in accordance with the fee structure outlined in ATTACHMENT A.”). 
 94. Id. § II.F.17. 
 95. See Conarck, supra note 11. 
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for all inmate purchases, excluding the tablet device itself.96 The 
generated commission is deposited into the “Privately-Operated 
Institutions Inmate Welfare Trust Fund” (PWTF).97 Additionally, the 
contract provides for “Value-Added Services,” including video relay 
service, educational tablets, communications monitoring, personal 
computer refresh, officer station iPads, network bandwidth 
sharing/MDM, additional network installations, phone time purchases, 
connectivity for special housing units, friends and family email blasts, an 
electronic survey system, complementary content, and a law library.98 
The JPay Contract provides a higher quantity, and perhaps quality, of 
benefits to the prison facilities than the Access Contract provided. Under 
the JPay Contract, the prison facilities became equipped with more 
advanced technology to monitor inmate behavior, enhance 
communication between inmates and their loved ones through the use of 
email and video visitations, and provide inmates with various forms of 
entertainment—as opposed to merely relying on physical copies of books 
located in the prison libraries. The Access Contract seemingly did not 
provide any benefits to prison facilities outside of the commission derived 
from sales to the inmates; instead, the majority of the benefits that 
inmates received under the Access Contract were aimed at providing 
inmates with musical entertainment options. The FDC’s benefit-centered 
approach in its transition to the JPay Contract reveals the prisons’ motive: 
to derive the maximum amount of possible benefits from the contract. 
The transition does not appear to consider the losses and expenses 
incurred by inmates and their families. 
C.  The Impact of the Transition of Privity from Access Corrections 
to JPay 
The JPay Contract stands to benefit the FDC and, in some ways, 
Florida inmates. In other ways, however, the program stands to injure 
inmates and potentially Florida citizens. Both the benefits and downfalls 
stem from the elimination of inmates’ music files purchased through the 
Access Program, the likelihood of double compensation for the FDC 
through the inmates’ repurchasing those files, and the change in 
destination of the excess funds from Florida’s General Revenue Fund to 
the PWTF. 
 
 96. See JPay Contract, supra note 8, amend. 1, ¶ 7 (“[I]n exchange for the provision of these 
services, [JPay] shall provide payment to the [FDC] of all commissions and fees . . . at the 
[following] rates . . . Fifteen percent (15%) commission on all purchases made by inmates at 
Private Prisons and Customer purchases related to inmates in Private Prisons (this excludes the 
cost of the tablets themselves).”). 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id. § II.F.18. 
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may unlock and take home the JPay tablets once an inmate completes his 
prison sentence.86 
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1.  Impact on the Florida Department of Corrections 
Under the JPay Contract, private prisons will receive a second round 
of commission for any music files an inmate repurchases.99 Every 
participating prison facility will receive value-added services as benefits 
of the contract as well as any revenue placed in the PWTF.100 The excess 
money placed in the PWTF may be invested directly into the prison itself, 
whereas the General Revenue Fund of the state serves to benefit Florida 
citizens as a whole.101  
If the prisons received commission only from the initial contract, their 
profits would arguably be harmless. However, the JPay commission 
model is designed to be cumulative: Commission earned on song 
repurchases is counted in addition to the commission earned on initial 
purchases under the Access Program. In this sense, prisons can profit 
each time that they decide to enter a new contract with a new company, 
and since no one appears to be representing the inmates’ interests during 
these renegotiations, inmates are bound to lose something—tangible or 
not—during each transition. These contracts are executed with the 
conscious objective of maximizing profits for the prisons with little 
regard for the vulnerable position in which inmates are placed. 
2.  Impact on Florida Inmates 
As a result of the transition from the Access Contract to the JPay 
Contract, an inmate must sacrifice his MP3 player, regardless of whether 
that inmate wishes to participate in the JPay Tablet Program. This loss is 
“remedied” by replacing the inmate’s MP3 player with a JPay tablet and 
providing a $10 store credit.102 Facially, this may seem just, but more 
issues arise. For instance, a $10 store credit only accounts for 
approximately five of the songs that an inmate purchased during Access’s 
tenure. It disregards the amount of money that an inmate spent building 
his music library over the last seven years. It also disregards the 
additional expenses that an inmate must incur to repurchase the files that 
he lost during the transition. This means a windfall for the prisons each 
time that a prisoner must restart his music library. 
The effects of these incursions reverberate beyond the prison walls. 
Inmates mainly rely on friends and family outside of the prison as their 
 
 99. Id. amend. 1, at ¶ 7.  
 100. See id. § II.F.18; id. amend. 1, ¶ 7. 
 101. See Conarck, supra note 11 (“In the Access Corrections contract, revenue left over after 
paying to run the program went back in a general fund controlled by the Legislature. But in the 
JPay contract, the Department retains any excess revenue in its administrative trust fund.”); see 
also JPay Contract, supra note 8, § II.F.18 (discussing the value-added services); id. amend. 1, ¶ 
7 (discussing private prison commissions). 
 102. See JPay Contract, supra note 8, § II.F.17. 
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primary source of income.103 This may cause financial hardship for an 
inmate’s family struggling to replace old song files. If it were feasible for 
the inmates to repurchase every song that they previously owned through 
the Access Program, the FDC would receive double the commissions 
since the prisons have already been compensated once for the sales.104 
What is more, nothing limits the number of times that the prisons may 
pull this transition. Thus, the erasure of files amounts to more profit for 
prisons, and in this case, it may amount to a second payout to the prisons. 
On the other hand, the JPay Contract provides some benefits to 
inmates, including video visitation capabilities.105 Video visitation may 
offer inmates more flexibility to see and speak with loved ones. For 
inmates incarcerated out of state, the costs and fees associated with the 
video visitations may offset transportation costs and be more convenient 
for their families. The tablet program also gives inmates access to more 
entertainment options than just music files.106 Now, inmates may 
purchase and download games and e-books onto their tablets.107 This 
expansion of entertainment options may result in increased educational 
opportunities for Florida inmates.  
3.  Impact on Florida Citizens 
Although they are only indirectly affected by the transition in 
contracts, Florida citizens also have a stake in the contract change. 
Florida citizens are primarily affected by the excess funds no longer 
going into the State’s General Revenue Fund and instead only benefitting 
the prisons.108 Arguably, these excess funds could be used for the general 
welfare; however, the FDC is now permitted to put that money back into 
the prison facilities even after receiving the value-added benefits and 
commission provided to them by the JPay Contract.109 The lack of 
transparency in the process renders it difficult to capture the nature and 
scope of implications for the citizenry. Accordingly, this Note maintains 
its focus on the more directly affected constituency: the inmates. 
Nonetheless, the theory of unjust enrichment proposed as a solution for 
inmates could potentially extend to cover a citizen-based interest should 
the facts ultimately warrant it.110 
 
 103. See supra discussion Section I.B. 
 104. See Keefe Contract, supra note 7, amend. 1, ¶ 16. 
 105. See JPay Contract, supra note 8, §§ II.F.3.a, II.F.10. 
 106. See id. § II.F.8. 
 107. See id. § II.F.8.b, .d. 
 108. See id. amend. 1, ¶ 7. 
 109. Cf. id. (explaining that money will go directly into a privately owned trust fund). 
 110. It is also true that the state likely sits as a fiduciary to both the inmates and the public at 
large. For such a claim, the burden of proof is higher and exceptions broader. For those reasons, 
this Note centers on the overlooked, but more elegant, path of unjust enrichment.  
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III.  THE LAST LAUGH: BREAKING THE CHAINS OF PRIVITY IN PRIVATE 
LAW REMEDIES 
“[L]aw and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice 
and . . . when they fail in this purpose they become the dangerously 
structured dams that block the flow of social progress.”111 
Contracts lie at the heart of this controversy. Yet, neither contract law 
nor its remedies will solve this problem. The following Section explains 
how contract law fails to afford Florida inmates an opportunity to sue on 
their own behalves as nonparties to contracts. Though traditional contract 
law may leave both inmates and the public voiceless, restitution and 
unjust enrichment may provide a voice to those without judicial standing 
in other areas of substantive law such as tort, property, and contract law.  
A.  Contract Law and Third-Party Beneficiaries 
Generally, one must have privity to sue based on a contract.112 There 
is an explicit exception to this requirement, however, for intentional third-
party beneficiaries.113 When a third party incidentally benefits from a 
contract, no privity arises and he cannot sue.114 When a contract provides 
for the benefit of a third party, however, this intentional benefit functions 
as a proxy for privity—the intentional third-party beneficiary can sue, 
even as a nonparty.115 
The third-party-beneficiary doctrine is easily illustrated by a concrete 
example. Consider Lee, a homeowner who enjoys looking at his neighbor 
Ben’s lawn. Ben contracts with a local landscaping company, so his lawn 
is nice to look at. If either Ben or the landscaping company breaches their 
contract, Lee likely does not have standing to sue—he is not a party to 
the contract and the benefit that he derives from the contract (his nice 
view and increased property value) is merely incidental. However, if Lee 
 
 111. Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr., to Clergymen (Apr. 16, 1963) (“Letter from a 
Birmingham Jail”), https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html 
[https://perma.cc/CYW6-98NS]. 
 112. See Privity of Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 113. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts: The Contractual Governance of 
Virtual Worlds, 53 MCGILL L.J. 427, 453 (2008) (“Third-party-beneficiary clauses require that the 
beneficiary be the intended, not just the incidental, beneficiary of a contractual promise.”). 
 114. See Michael Risch, Virtual Third Parties, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 415, 418 (2009) (“[T]he [third-party-beneficiary] doctrine only protects non-parties who are 
intended to benefit from the contract . . . . The “intention” threshold for such an extra-contractual 
action is strict; the contracting parties must intentionally bestow something of value, an 
affirmative benefit, or even a savings, on the third party.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 115. See id. at 419 (“[I]f the [intention] threshold is surpassed, then the [third-party 
beneficiary] can sue the breaching party even if the other contracting party will not.”). 
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can prove that his nice view and increased property value were intentional 
benefits of the contract, Lee may sue the breaching party himself.  
This doctrine may be triggered whenever a nonparty to a contract is 
affected,  allowing nonparties to exercise “rights that might otherwise be 
ignored by the contracting parties.”116 In these situations, the third party 
is allowed to step into the shoes of a contracting party and sue another 
party for breach.117 
In the prison-servicer contracts, Florida inmates and citizens are 
nonparties to the contract.118 And unfortunately, the contracts explicitly 
erase any possibility of intended third-party beneficiaries through a 
provision denoting that they did not intend to create beneficiaries.119 Both 
the Access and JPay Contracts include the following provision: “Except 
as otherwise expressly provided herein, neither this Contract, nor any 
amendment, addendum or exhibit attached hereto, nor term, provision or 
clause contained therein, shall be construed as being for the benefit of, or 
providing a benefit to, any party not a signatory hereto.”120 As such, 
neither Florida inmates nor Florida citizens have standing to sue under 
traditional contract law. The third-party-beneficiary doctrine may only be 
invoked when the nonparty is an “intended” beneficiary, rather than an 
“incidental” beneficiary.121  
Because the inmates are incidental by definition, they cannot sue as 
nonparties. Theoretically, the inmates could sue for status 
reconceptualization—they are arguably intended to be beneficiaries of 
the contract. While a neighbor might enter into a lawn care contract 
without any regard for who would be impacted, it can be argued that the 
FDC entered into a contract with Access with the full knowledge that 
inmates would be both impacted and benefitted as nonparties. Without 
the inmates, the contract would not exist. The prison only benefits from 
 
 116. See id. at 425. 
 117. See id. at 416–17. 
 118. See, e.g., Keefe Contract, supra note 7 (“This Contract is between the Florida 
Department of Corrections . . . and the Keefe Commissary Network, LLC . . . .”). 
 119. See JPay Contract, supra note 8, § VII.Z; Keefe Contract, supra note 7, § IV.Z. 
 120. JPay Contract, supra note 8, § VII.Z.; Keefe Contract, supra note 7, § IV.Z.  
 121. Risch, supra note 114, at 418–19.  
Receipt of benefits by the third party does not end the inquiry; the [third-
party-beneficiary] doctrine only protects non-parties who are intended to benefit 
from the contract. Only then may a third party sue for a contractual breach despite 
not being a party to the agreement. The “intention” threshold for such an extra-
contractual action is strict; the contracting parties must intentionally bestow 
something of value, an affirmative benefit, or even a savings, on the third party. 
The third party cannot be a remote or an “incidental” beneficiary.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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party-beneficiary] doctrine only protects non-parties who are intended to benefit 
from the contract. Only then may a third party sue for a contractual breach despite 
not being a party to the agreement. The “intention” threshold for such an extra-
contractual action is strict; the contracting parties must intentionally bestow 
something of value, an affirmative benefit, or even a savings, on the third party. 
The third party cannot be a remote or an “incidental” beneficiary.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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the Access Contract if the inmates, as nonparties to the contract, 
participate in the Access Program. If inmates do not purchase MP3 
players or music, the FDC does not receive any derived benefit 
(commission) from Access. The same is true for the JPay Contract. 
The inmates, as a narrow class of beneficiaries, are the only consumers 
from whom a prison’s commission derives. Unlike a neighbor who enjoys 
a nice view, the inmates are contemplated, intended beneficiaries and are 
not merely incidental to the contracts. The inmates are also an identifiable 
group of consumers who directly benefit from the contracts. Unlike in the 
lawn care hypothetical, where any passerby could be considered an 
incidental beneficiary, the general inmate population of these prison 
facilities is readily discernable. Further, inmates who purchase the 
products available to them per the contracts are an even narrower 
identifiable class. This analogy reveals a discrepancy inherent in the 
inmates’ currently defined status as incidental beneficiaries. 
The FDC has consciously eliminated any rights that inmates may have 
had under the contracts, even if the private media companies—as 
opposed to the prisons themselves—breach the contracts. This express 
elimination of beneficiaries displays a conscious effort to take advantage 
of inmate vulnerability because, without any standing under traditional 
contract law, the inmates must apparently tolerate any contract-related 
injustices that come their way. 
However, even if the inmates were labeled intended third-party 
beneficiaries, damages may be hard to show and limited to out-of-pocket 
reliance costs or other causal losses.122 Further, this status would only put 
the inmates in privity for the purposes of a lawsuit if an actual party 
breached the contract.123 The inmates would still be unable to sue a prison 
for any wrong the prison committed against them because neither party 
breached the contract. Thus, the contract route may be flawed regardless 
of the inmates’ status as intended or incidental third-party beneficiaries 
since the evidence fails to demonstrate a typical breach of contract. 
If a court considers the inmates as third-party beneficiaries under any 
such contracts, inmates’ lawyers would be wise to consider whether an 
opportunistic-breach-of-contract claim124 might help characterize the 
 
 122. See generally David M. Summers, Note, Third Party Beneficiaries and the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 880 (1982) (explaining the theoretical basis for third-
party recovery under the third-party-beneficiary doctrine). 
 123. See Risch, supra note 114, at 416–17. 
 124. An opportunistic-breach-of-contract claim is also novel and grounds itself in unjust 
enrichment law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND RESTITUTION § 39 cmt. 
a (AM. Law INST. 2011). An opportunistic breach of contract arises when one of the contracting 
parties breaches the contract for a bigger, better deal with another party. See generally Caprice L. 
Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement as a Moral Compass for Breach of Contract, 77 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 991 (2009) (discussing the application of the opportunistic-breach-of-contract doctrine). 
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wrongdoing more properly. Such a theory connects contract law to unjust 
enrichment through a powerful restitution remedy of profit disgorgement 
to undo unjust enrichment.125 The following Section presents the most 
viable theory—a freestanding theory of unjust enrichment. Freestanding 
means that no contract rights or breach of contract is necessary.126 Unjust 
enrichment alone could be the ideal cause of action and the best remedy 
to deter the state and prevent unjust enrichment at the inmates’ expense. 
B.  Unjust Enrichment and Restitution 
Restitution, put simply, means restoration.127 The seminal remedies 
treatise defines restitution as “a return or restoration of what defendant 
has gained in a transaction. It may be a return of a specific thing or it may 
be a ‘return’ of a money substitute for that thing.”128 Restitution provides 
both “a substantive basis to sue as well as a host of formidable 
remedies.”129 Such remedies may be sought as a result of a freestanding 
unjust enrichment cause of action or as a “piggyback” remedy for tort, 
contract, or property law causes of action.130 The purpose of restitution is 
to prevent a defendant’s unjust enrichment by restoring any gains or 
benefits where it would be unjust for the defendant to retain them in the 
absence of restoration.131 
In contrast to other substantive areas of law, which offer 
compensatory damages to restore the plaintiff to his rightful position, 
unjust enrichment and restitution focus on the defendant’s gains, not the 
plaintiff’s losses.132 As such, restitutionary recovery may sometimes 
prove to be more desirable for plaintiffs than damages. For example, 
 
 125. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND RESTITUTION § 39 cmt. c (AM. 
LAW INST. 2011). For an exploration of the nature of unjust enrichment, see infra Section III.B. 
Here, if the FDC would have breached the Keefe Contract for a bigger, better deal with JPay, the 
inmates—if classified as intended third-party beneficiaries—could seek the disgorgement of any 
profits FDC has retained or will retain as a result of the new contract. 
 126. See DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 380. 
 127. Id. at 370. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id.  
 130. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. e(3) 
(AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“[T]he remedy of restitution is a device available in appropriate 
circumstances—as an alternative to damages—to enforce obligations derived from torts, 
contracts, and other topics of substantive law.”). 
 131. See DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 370. 
 132. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. d (AM. LAW 
INST. 2011) (“The law of torts identifies those circumstances in which a person is liable for injury 
inflicted, measuring liability by the extent of the harm; the law of restitution identifies those 
circumstances in which a person is liable for the benefits received, measuring liability by the 
extent of the benefit.”); ANDREW KULL & WARD FARNSWORTH, RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT: CASES AND NOTES 1 (2018) (“[The law of tort] awards damages to victims of wrongs 
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not merely incidental to the contracts. The inmates are also an identifiable 
group of consumers who directly benefit from the contracts. Unlike in the 
lawn care hypothetical, where any passerby could be considered an 
incidental beneficiary, the general inmate population of these prison 
facilities is readily discernable. Further, inmates who purchase the 
products available to them per the contracts are an even narrower 
identifiable class. This analogy reveals a discrepancy inherent in the 
inmates’ currently defined status as incidental beneficiaries. 
The FDC has consciously eliminated any rights that inmates may have 
had under the contracts, even if the private media companies—as 
opposed to the prisons themselves—breach the contracts. This express 
elimination of beneficiaries displays a conscious effort to take advantage 
of inmate vulnerability because, without any standing under traditional 
contract law, the inmates must apparently tolerate any contract-related 
injustices that come their way. 
However, even if the inmates were labeled intended third-party 
beneficiaries, damages may be hard to show and limited to out-of-pocket 
reliance costs or other causal losses.122 Further, this status would only put 
the inmates in privity for the purposes of a lawsuit if an actual party 
breached the contract.123 The inmates would still be unable to sue a prison 
for any wrong the prison committed against them because neither party 
breached the contract. Thus, the contract route may be flawed regardless 
of the inmates’ status as intended or incidental third-party beneficiaries 
since the evidence fails to demonstrate a typical breach of contract. 
If a court considers the inmates as third-party beneficiaries under any 
such contracts, inmates’ lawyers would be wise to consider whether an 
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wrongdoing more properly. Such a theory connects contract law to unjust 
enrichment through a powerful restitution remedy of profit disgorgement 
to undo unjust enrichment.125 The following Section presents the most 
viable theory—a freestanding theory of unjust enrichment. Freestanding 
means that no contract rights or breach of contract is necessary.126 Unjust 
enrichment alone could be the ideal cause of action and the best remedy 
to deter the state and prevent unjust enrichment at the inmates’ expense. 
B.  Unjust Enrichment and Restitution 
Restitution, put simply, means restoration.127 The seminal remedies 
treatise defines restitution as “a return or restoration of what defendant 
has gained in a transaction. It may be a return of a specific thing or it may 
be a ‘return’ of a money substitute for that thing.”128 Restitution provides 
both “a substantive basis to sue as well as a host of formidable 
remedies.”129 Such remedies may be sought as a result of a freestanding 
unjust enrichment cause of action or as a “piggyback” remedy for tort, 
contract, or property law causes of action.130 The purpose of restitution is 
to prevent a defendant’s unjust enrichment by restoring any gains or 
benefits where it would be unjust for the defendant to retain them in the 
absence of restoration.131 
In contrast to other substantive areas of law, which offer 
compensatory damages to restore the plaintiff to his rightful position, 
unjust enrichment and restitution focus on the defendant’s gains, not the 
plaintiff’s losses.132 As such, restitutionary recovery may sometimes 
prove to be more desirable for plaintiffs than damages. For example, 
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inmates—if classified as intended third-party beneficiaries—could seek the disgorgement of any 
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ENRICHMENT: CASES AND NOTES 1 (2018) (“[The law of tort] awards damages to victims of wrongs 
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[s]uppose defendant steals plaintiff’s watch, the value of 
which was admittedly only $30. Defendant is able to sell the 
watch for more than its value, say $40. Plaintiff’s loss is a 
watch valued at $30 and his damages recovery measured by 
loss is $30. The goal is compensatory. But defendant’s gain 
is $40 and plaintiff’s restitutionary recovery measured by 
that gain is $40. In this example, defendant is unjustly 
enriched, and plaintiff is entitled to restitution. Not all 
restitution is in money. The watch example shows, however, 
that when restitution is made in money, the restitution 
remedy can yield results quite different from the money 
remedy called damages.133 
Thus, plaintiffs may elect restitutionary recovery when their recovery 
would exceed the recovery allowed by typical compensatory damages.134 
Notably, restitution is neither compensatory nor punitive in nature.135 
An unjust enrichment claim may be brought without the requirement 
of an underlying tort, contract, or property claim.136 The most common 
example of freestanding restitution is a mistaken bank transfer.137 
Professor Doug Rendleman offers the following hypothetical: 
[A] misaimed First Bank computer fires . . . money into 
Sarah’s checking account, no gift to Sarah was intended, no 
contract between the two was breached, no conversion or 
other tort occurred, and no property right was infringed. But 
 
to compensate them for their losses. . . . The law of restitution takes the opposite approach. It is 
focused on gain-based recovery—that is, on lawsuits in which the plaintiff seeks to take away 
gains that the defendant should not have made, rather than obtaining compensation for losses that 
the plaintiff should not have suffered.”). 
 133. See DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 370 (footnote omitted). 
 134. Where punitive damages are desired, a plaintiff must carefully consider her options and 
proceed with a demand for damages. 
 135. See Doug Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution: Coordinating Restitution with 
Compensatory Damages and Punitive Damages, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973, 980 (2011). 
 136. See KULL & FARNSWORTH, supra note 132, at 1 (“But there are also many important 
situations in which a suit to take away a defendant’s gains can solve problems that are not reached 
by any other body of law at all.”); Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 
1192 (1995) (“In some cases, a theory of unjust enrichment provides the only available 
explanation of why the defendant is liable at all.”); Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance 
of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1284 (1989) (“Defendant may be unjustly enriched without 
having committed any other civil wrong.”); Caprice L. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement for 
Opportunistic Breach of Contract and Mitigation of Damages, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 131, 136 
(2008) (“[M]any cases arise under freestanding restitution or unjust enrichment claims, i.e., the 
plaintiff does not need an underlying contract, tort, or property claim.”). 
 137. DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES CASES & MATERIALS 517 (3d ed. 
2018). 
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the money unjustly enriches Sarah, and surprise!, surprise!, 
she cannot keep it.138  
In the hypothetical, Sarah earned a benefit (money into her checking 
account) at the expense of the plaintiff (because the plaintiff lost money), 
which unjustly enriched Sarah (because there was no gratuitous or other 
intent behind the transfer). Thus, Sarah is obligated to return the money. 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment explains 
that “[t]he benefit that is the basis of a restitution claim may take any 
form, direct or indirect.”139 This benefit may come in the form of property 
as well as goods and services.140 Liability in restitution for receipt of a 
benefit may be determined by a variety of factors,141 which may include: 
“(1) the plaintiff conferred a benefit upon the defendant; (2) the defendant 
had an appreciation or knowledge of the benefit; and (3) the defendant 
accepted or retained the benefit under circumstances making it 
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment of its 
value.”142 Intangible benefits, such as services rendered, may be difficult 
to measure since the law of restitution is more concerned with the 
reasonable value of those services.143 
Determining whether an enrichment is “unjust” is the essential 
inquiry.144 Kull notes, “The central problem of the law of restitution is to 
identify those instances of enrichment that the law regards as unjust; in 
other words, to distinguish benefits that have to be paid for from those 
 
 138. Id.  
 139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. c (AM. LAW 
INST. 2011) (emphasis omitted). 
 140. See id. § 1 cmt. d.  
 141. See id. 
 142. Id. The Restatement further explains that the factors may be unhelpful:  
The third element of the foregoing list, referring to “circumstances making it 
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit,” incorporates the whole of the 
question presented, making the rest of the formula superfluous. The second 
element, the defendant’s “appreciation or knowledge of the benefit,” is both 
mysterious and potentially mischievous. If the requirement is taken to mean that 
a defendant cannot be liable in restitution for benefits of which the defendant was 
unaware—or for benefits that the defendant attempted to refuse—it is plainly 
incorrect. If it refers to defensive limitations on a liability based on unjust 
enrichment, it is both redundant (in light of the third element) and an awkward 
summary of several features of the law of restitution that protect the defendant’s 
economic liberty.  
Id. 
 143. See Roberts, supra note 124, at 1016. 
 144. Kull, supra note 136, at 1226. 
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watch valued at $30 and his damages recovery measured by 
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remedy can yield results quite different from the money 
remedy called damages.133 
Thus, plaintiffs may elect restitutionary recovery when their recovery 
would exceed the recovery allowed by typical compensatory damages.134 
Notably, restitution is neither compensatory nor punitive in nature.135 
An unjust enrichment claim may be brought without the requirement 
of an underlying tort, contract, or property claim.136 The most common 
example of freestanding restitution is a mistaken bank transfer.137 
Professor Doug Rendleman offers the following hypothetical: 
[A] misaimed First Bank computer fires . . . money into 
Sarah’s checking account, no gift to Sarah was intended, no 
contract between the two was breached, no conversion or 
other tort occurred, and no property right was infringed. But 
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the money unjustly enriches Sarah, and surprise!, surprise!, 
she cannot keep it.138  
In the hypothetical, Sarah earned a benefit (money into her checking 
account) at the expense of the plaintiff (because the plaintiff lost money), 
which unjustly enriched Sarah (because there was no gratuitous or other 
intent behind the transfer). Thus, Sarah is obligated to return the money. 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment explains 
that “[t]he benefit that is the basis of a restitution claim may take any 
form, direct or indirect.”139 This benefit may come in the form of property 
as well as goods and services.140 Liability in restitution for receipt of a 
benefit may be determined by a variety of factors,141 which may include: 
“(1) the plaintiff conferred a benefit upon the defendant; (2) the defendant 
had an appreciation or knowledge of the benefit; and (3) the defendant 
accepted or retained the benefit under circumstances making it 
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value.”142 Intangible benefits, such as services rendered, may be difficult 
to measure since the law of restitution is more concerned with the 
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inquiry.144 Kull notes, “The central problem of the law of restitution is to 
identify those instances of enrichment that the law regards as unjust; in 
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that we can retain without payment.”145 The law of unjust enrichment 
recognizes that benefits conferred by volunteers and officious 
intermeddlers are benefits that may be justly retained without payment.146 
Kull continues: 
[T]he problem of identifying unjust enrichment subsumes 
the other characteristic difficulties of the subject. These 
include the problem of measuring a restitutionary recovery 
(how much of this benefit, in the hands of this defendant, 
constitutes unjust enrichment?), as well as the defenses to 
restitution (are there additional circumstances, such as 
change of position or bona fide purchase, making it 
inappropriate to conclude that this defendant has been 
unjustly enriched?).147 
Here, the unjust enrichment arises when prisons require inmates to 
forfeit their media players and music files,148 as well as purchase new 
song files to build their music libraries, to participate in a new program. 
The initial benefits (commission) from the Access Contract constitute 
benefits that may be justly retained without repayment; that is, because 
the inmates voluntarily participated in the media program and the prisons 
directly benefited from their participation through commission awarded 
to them by Access, there is arguably no issue with this scenario. However, 
the scenario becomes muddied when inmates have to pay, a second time, 
for the same benefit they had already received, and prisons benefit, a 
second time, through value-added services to the prison facilities and 
commissions. This enrichment comes at the expense of the inmates, their 
families, and the public because (1) the inmates and their families must 
use their own personal funds to repurchase and restore the music libraries; 
(2) the inmates must “surrender” their media players; and (3) the public 
loses the benefit of having the excess funds deposited into the State 
General Revenue fund, which is used to benefit the state as a whole. 
The situation currently unfolding in Florida most resembles a 
freestanding unjust enrichment cause of action. The benefit to the inmates 
(media and music files)149 is more like goods than services because the 
inmates are not actually conducting or completing any action upon which 
the prisons are profiting. Traditional unjust enrichment takes the 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Laycock, supra note 136, at 1284; see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 112 
(AM. LAW INST. 1937) (“[A] person is entitled to restitution for a benefit conferred as the result of 
mistake[,] including fraud . . . or of coercion, whether caused by duress or the necessity of 
protecting the transferor’s interests . . . or of an agreement by the transferee . . . .”). 
 147. Kull, supra note 136, at 1226. 
 148. The “surrender” of inmates’ MP3 players, which are designed for a particular use within 
prison facilities, may also constitute a form of conversion. 
 149. Though the music files are intangible, “goods” still seems to be the appropriate label. 
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approach that the prisons would have to “give back” the unjustly retained 
benefit, but here, that approach is imperfect because the prisons have 
nothing tangible to “give back” to the inmates, other than the initial 
expenses that the inmates incurred to purchase the media players and 
song files. Further, the prisons have not received a benefit that the inmates 
should have retained, but the prisons arguably have the potential to 
receive a benefit that the public should have received—the excess funds 
that are now being directed to the prison funds. By redirecting and 
keeping the excess funds within the prison system, the public suffers 
because the funds could have benefited the state of Florida as a whole.  
Fortunately, modern restitution is broader than the traditional 
approach and allows courts to determine and measure conferred benefits 
in their own fashion. Prisons are using the number of inmates as a large 
captive market to enable negotiations for bigger, better deals—such as 
the one they have secured with JPay. Each time the prisons enter into a 
better deal, they are increasing their profits off the backs of the inmates 
and their families. Without inmate participation in the media programs, 
the prison systems would receive no profits. Under this modern approach, 
a court may measure the prisons’ retained benefits at the inmates’ 
expense by the amount of commission the prisons initially received from 
the Access Contract; the reasonable value of the value-added services that 
the prisons received as a benefit of the JPay Contract; the percentage of 
commission that the prisons may make in a given time frame; or, perhaps, 
any traceable profits, purchases, or property that derive from the inmates’ 
participation in the media programs. 
IV.  MONETIZING MISFORTUNE: SOLUTIONS TO REMEDY THE INJUSTICE 
“[B]ut the very folks who often express so much concern . . . about 
the cost and the expanse of the [prison] system are often very unwilling 
to talk in any serious way about remedying the harm that has been 
done.”150 
A truly comprehensive solution to the problems created by prison 
privatization would encompass both stripping prisons of any undeserved 
profit and restoring any deserved benefits to inmates. Legislation is 
perhaps the most practical option. An exception to the Florida 
Administrative Code that would allow inmates more than one media 
player resolves the problem of having to take away what inmates have 
already paid for so that they can participate in a new program. Further 
provisions might also require inmate representation during contract 
negotiations. If for some reason this solution is not practicable, it is 
imperative that prisons at least lose the financial benefits that they have 
gained at inmates’ expense. Without that part of the solution, the 
 
 150. 13TH (Netflix 2016). 
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that we can retain without payment.”145 The law of unjust enrichment 
recognizes that benefits conferred by volunteers and officious 
intermeddlers are benefits that may be justly retained without payment.146 
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approach that the prisons would have to “give back” the unjustly retained 
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player resolves the problem of having to take away what inmates have 
already paid for so that they can participate in a new program. Further 
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negotiations. If for some reason this solution is not practicable, it is 
imperative that prisons at least lose the financial benefits that they have 
gained at inmates’ expense. Without that part of the solution, the 
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incentive to contract with private companies for profit—without 
consideration of inmates’ interests—will continue to create adverse 
consequences for inmates.  
A.  Potential Remedies 
In unjust enrichment claims, courts look to the benefits gained by the 
defendant, rather than the plaintiff’s loss.151 Here, the FDC’s benefits 
may be measured by the value-added services and commission awarded 
to them by the JPay Contract. Admittedly, the commission that the FDC 
will receive from the JPay Contract may be arbitrary because the contract 
is new and has not yet had a significant length of time to result in an 
“average” amount of commissions. However, a court may look to the 
Access Contract to determine the average amount of sales or commission 
earned per inmate participating in the media program. Once a court can 
determine this average, inmates may have access to potential remedial 
pathways. 
The easiest—and, for the prisons, cheapest—option is to make an 
exception to the Florida Administrative Code provision limiting inmates 
to one media player. In this case, inmates may keep the limited song files 
on their Access MP3 player and have the option to participate in and 
benefit from the JPay Tablet Program by purchasing any new songs, e-
books, and games that the inmates desire. Here, the prisons would not 
receive the second round of commission, and the commission received 
on new sales is arguably harmless to the inmates since the inmates will 
not incur any expenses that they would not have incurred under the 
Access Contract. This option is the cheapest for the prisons because they 
may justly enrich themselves moving forward in the JPay Contract 
without having to worry about remedying the enrichment in the future. 
However, if the option of keeping two media players is not feasible 
for some legitimate reason, the disgorgement of a prison’s commission 
may be an appropriate remedy.152 In this case, the court would strip the 
prison of any wrongful profit received from the awarded commission of 
songs previously purchased by the inmates during the Access tenure.153 
Here, the prison would lose any unjust benefits (that is, double 
commission) to “undo” the enrichment. If the prison had already spent 
the money, the court may use a tracing technique to “trace,” or follow, 
how the money was spent.154 That is, if the prison used the second round 
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of commission to buy new bathroom equipment, the court may award the 
inmates a constructive trust or an equitable lien in the property.155 
A constructive trust is not a traditional trust; it is a legal fiction.156 
Once the funds are traced to that specific property, the court can issue an 
injunction and force the prison to sell or forfeit the bathroom 
equipment.157 A constructive trust would grant the inmates complete 
title.158 However, if the funds used to purchase that bathroom equipment 
were commingled with any funds that the prison already had (or justly 
received), an equitable lien would be a more appropriate remedy.159 In 
the case of an equitable lien, the inmates would only receive a security 
bond, which can then be used to secure a money claim.160 Here, an 
equitable lien makes the most sense because the bathroom equipment 
would, in a sense, belong to any inmates who repurchase songs that they 
once owned on their MP3 players. The inmates could force the sale of the 
bathroom equipment and use the funds from the sale to reimburse 
themselves. This remedial pathway is more difficult and expensive than 
allowing the inmates to keep their previously purchased MP3 players. 
Alternatively, the FDC could look to the purchases made during the 
Access tenure and reimburse the inmates for those purchases through 
JPay store credits. Courts should consider deducting the $10 store credit 
that the prisons have already provided to the inmates to begin their new 
song libraries under the JPay Contract. Though it should be recognized 
that $10 is not nearly enough money for inmates who have been building 
their libraries for years. Under the JPay Contract, the $10 store credit 
equates to approximately five songs. Any repurchased song beyond those 
five songs is an unjustly retained benefit of which the prisons must be 
stripped. 
B.  Call for Legislation 
The legislature should enact policies to protect inmates’ interests. 
Currently, prisons and private vendors may explicitly exclude inmates’ 
interests from contracts to protect themselves from litigation. When 
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prisons negotiate contracts that intend inmates as the sole consumers, the 
contracts should reflect consideration of potential adverse consequences 
and potential remedies should the contract come to an end. To achieve 
this, the legislature should consider requiring prisons to have someone 
representing the inmates’ interests present at the bargaining table.161  
This person would represent inmates in contracting decisions that may 
directly affect inmates, even when those decisions affect inmates only as 
incidental third-party beneficiaries. Here, the inmates participated in a 
program with the expectation of paying a onetime fee that would allow 
them to take their unlocked media players home upon release from prison. 
However, when the media player contract ended and the tablet contract 
took its place, the inmates were adversely affected—they lost their media 
players and their song libraries—without a suitable remedy; the inmates’ 
expectations were frustrated. At the very least, providing inmates with 
warnings or disclaimers that explain how they may be impacted when a 
contract with a specific private contractor ends may improve this type of 
situation. To effectively address the problem, however, legislation 
requiring a representative for inmates’ interests may be necessary.  
Legislation to protect inmates’ interests should also limit compulsory 
“all or nothing” approaches that force inmates to either agree to all terms 
or abstain entirely. Here, the inmates face a compulsory contract that 
forces them to surrender their media players and song libraries in 
exchange for a tablet and $10 store credit.  
Further, the prisons’ suggestion—allowing inmates to pay a fee to 
have their media players shipped to an outside address, ostensibly to 
reserve the media players for use after prison—does not provide an 
adequate remedy. First, inmates have already paid for the media players 
and the songs; therefore, paying a second fee to have them shipped 
outside the prison does not present a fair “choice.” Second, inmates buy 
their media players with the intent of using them in prison—removing a 
media player from an inmate’s possession in prison and returning the 
media player to his possession upon release does not repair the intrusion 
on the inmate’s rights. And inmates who do not have an address to which 
they can mail their media players, who do not have a friend or family 
member to keep their media players for them, or who stand to be 
imprisoned for years beyond the usability of the media players—or who 
will never be released—receive no remedy at all. For inmates on Death 
Row, for example, such a “solution” forces them to “wait” to receive the 
full benefits of their purchase, which will never be possible. These 
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inmates could only send their media players to outside locations that they 
will likely never visit again.  
Other issues arise when participation is the only way that inmates may 
receive the benefits of the program. For instance, in facilities where 
access to in-person visitation with inmates has significantly decreased,162 
inmates will be, in a sense, forced to pay whatever fees are attached to 
video visitation to visit with loved ones. This solution provides more 
flexibility to inmates coming from families of higher socioeconomic 
statuses because poorer inmates may be unable to pay the additional fees 
that come along with the new tablets. 
CONCLUSION 
State prisons are regularly affecting earned and purchased benefits of 
their captive consumers: inmates. The dangers of such nontransparent and 
nonaccountable decision-making are plenty, especially where explicit 
contract language renders the inmates voiceless. Unjust enrichment 
theory may provide a novel approach to reconsidering the scope of the 
states’ unjust profiting at the expense of their captive inmates. If state 
prisons are consciously taking advantage of their prison populations, it is 
vital that the law seeks, at a minimum, transparency to deter and prevent 
unjust enrichment in the future. The judiciary and the legislature should 
create accessible pathways for inmates to protest the accrual of ill-gotten 
gains occurring throughout our prison system through unjust enrichment. 
This Note offers a way to better balance the power between a state and 
those in its care. 
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